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I. Introduction1 
 
  After the pioneering German “Aktiengesetz” of 19652 and the Brazilian “Lei das 
Sociedades Anónimas” of 19763, Portugal has become the third country in the world to 
enact a specific regulation o n groups of  companies. The Code of Commercial 
Companies ( “ Código das Sociedades Comerciais”, abbreviately hereinafter CSC), 
enacted in 1986, contains a unitary set of rules  regulating the relationships between  
companies, in general, and the groups of companies, in particular (arts. 481° to 508°-E 
CSC).4 
  With this set of rules, the Portuguese legislator has dealt with one of the major 
topics of modern Company Law. While this branch of law is traditionally conceived as 
the law of the individual company, modern economic reality is characterized by the 
massive emergence of large-scale enterprise networks, where parts of a whole business 
are allocated and insulated in several legally independent companies submitted to an 
unified economic direction. As Tom HADDEN put it: “Company lawyers still write and 
talk as if the single independent company, with its shareholders, directors and 
employees, was the norm. In reality, the individual company ceased to be the most 
significant form of organization in the 1920s and 1930s. The commercial world is now 
dominated both nationally and internationally by complex groups of companies”.5 This 
                                            
1  On Portuguese group law, see ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades – Estrutura e Organização 
Jurídica da Empresa Plurissocietária, 2
th edition, Almedina, Coimbra, 2002. As to literature on the topic 
in German language, see also GAUSE,  B.,  Europäisches Konzernrecht im Vergleich  – Eine 
Untersuchung auf der Grundlage des portugiesischen Rechts, Berlin Verlag/ Nomos, Berlin, 2000; 
LUTTER, M./ OVERRATH, H.-P., Das portugiesische Konzernrecht von 1986, in: 20 “Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht” (1991), 394-411. 
2 The literature on German group law (“Konzernrecht”) is extremely vast: to a general overview, see 
EMMERICH, V./ HABERSACK, M., Konzernrecht, 8
th edition, Beck, München, 2005; to an overview 
of the literature itself until the middle of the 80s, see KIRCHNER, C., Bibliographie zum Unternehmens- 
und Gesellschaftsrecht 1950 bis 1985, Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht (Sonderheft 
8), 482-530, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1989. 
3 On Brazilian group law, see COMPARATO, F., Les Groupes de Sociétés dans la Nouvelle Loi Brési-
lienne des Sociétés par Actions, in “Revue des Sociétés” (1978), 845-868. As to literature in German 
language, see ROTHMANN, G.,  Die Behandlung des Konzerns als gesellschaftsrechtliches 
Sonderproblem in Bresilien, in: MESTMÄCKER, E.-J./ BEHRENS, P., “Das Gesellschaftsrecht der 
Konzerns im internationalen Vergleich”, 217-232, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1991. 
4 More recently, some others countries have also adopted a specific regulation on this area, such as, for 
instance, Hungary, Eslovenia and Taiwan : see BRUS, M. Das slowenische Konzernrecht in seiner 
Herkunft aus dem deutschen Recht der verbundenen Unternehmen, Berlin Verlag, Berlin, 1999; KALÓ, 
H., Das Recht der verbundenen Unternehmen in Ungarn, in: “Wirtschaft un Recht in Östeuropa” (1994), 
452-459; YEH, H., Das taiwanesiche Konzernrecht von 1997, in: 29 “Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und 
Unternehmensrecht” (2000), 287-310. 
5 Inside Corporate Groups, 271, in: 12 “International Journal of the Sociology of Law” (1984), 271-276. 
See also WEDERBURN: “We speak, teach, litigate and legislate about «company law». But the predomi-  3
trend, which is now observable in any of the largest economies in the world, holds also 
true for small markets such as Portugal.  Although Portuguese economy is still 
dominated by  small and medium-sized enterprises, the organizational structure of the 
group has always been extremely common. During the 70s, it was estimated that the 
seven largest groups of companies  owned about 50% of the equity capital of all 
domestic enterprises and were alone responsible for 3/4 of the internal national product. 
Such a trend  has  continued  and even highlighted in the next decades, surviving to 
different political and economic scenarios: during the 80s, due to the process of state 
nationalization of these groups, an enormous public group with more than one thousand 
controlled companies has been created (“IPE - Instituto de Participações do Estado”); 
and during the 90s until today, thanks to the reprivatisation movement and the opening 
of our national market, we assisted to the re-emergence of some large private groups, 
composed of several hundred subsidiaries each, some of which are listed in foreign 
stock exchange markets (e.g., in the banking sector, “BCP  – Banco Comercial 
Português”, in the industrial area, “SONAE”, and in the media and communication area, 
“Portugal-Telecom”). 
 
II. The Statutory Regime in Perspective 
 
  1. General Overview 
 
  The regulation on groups and inter-company relationships is provided for in 
Title VI of the CSC (arts. 481° to 508°-E), under the general concept of “affiliated 
companies” (“sociedades coligadas”). 
 
  1.1. The Concept of Affiliated Company 
 
  The entire legal regulation is based  on  a central  concept: the concept of 
“affiliated company” (“sociedade coligada”), which thus operates as a sort of 
“summum genus” for this set of legal rules.  
The law does not provides for a general definition of what is an affiliated 
company but it merely describes the concrete types of affiliation relationships between 
                                                                                                                                 
nant reality is not today the company: it is the group of companies” (Multinationals and the Antiquities of   4
companies. These types of relationships are four  – the relationship of simple 
participation, of mutual participation, of control, and of group  – and they will b e 
analised subsequently. Before of that, it may be useful to point out some fundamental 
features of the said central concept.  
First of all, the concept of affiliated company is a  strict legal concept, not a 
factual one. Given the fact that the legal  “numerus clausus” of  inter-company 
relationships does not covers  all its possible economic  forms or types,  an affiliated 
company shall be deemed to exist only when fiting within the boundaries of  one of 
those four types of relationships identified by the law: t his regulatory strategy, of 
course, has the advantage of an increased juridical certainty, although may giving rise 
to regulatory gaps (take, for instance, the contrast between the relevant legal forms of a 
group of companies, provided for in arts. 488° and ff. CSC, and the huge diversity of its 
organizational economic forms). Secondly, the concept operates as a general legal term 
of reference for a particular sector of rules (arts. 481° to 508°-E CSC) to which legal 
regime numerous other norms of the same Code are referring to (v.g., arts. 6°, nº 3, 
104°, nº 2, 290°, nº 1, 397°, nº 3, 510°, nº 2 CSC). Finally, this is a company law 
concept, not a broad concept which is valid to all branches of the law. As we shall see 
further on6, other legal branches are also dealing increasingly with the problem of inter-
company relationships, thereby  making use of similar concepts which, however, may 
have a specific meaning on their own (v.g., in competition law, in labour law, in tax 
law): therefore, the concept of affiliated company used by the CSC shall be applicable 
outside company law only when expressly or implicitly provided for by the law itself 
(v.g., art. 21º, nº 3 of “Code of Securities”). 
 
  1.2. The Legal Types of Relationships of Affiliation 
  
  Under Portuguese law, affiliated companies are defined as being those, and only 
those, companies which hold among each other a relationship of one of the following 
four types:  relationship of simple participation, relationship of mutual participation, 
relationship of domination, and relationship of group (art. 482° CSC). 
A  relationship of simple participation (arts. 483° and 484° CSC) exists 
whenever a company holds at least 10% of the equity capital of another: in such a case, 
                                                                                                                                 
Company Law, 320, in: “Modern Law Review” (1983), 320-343).   5
the former company must thereafter inform by writing the latter of this fact, as well as 
of any further acquisitions or sales of its capital. A relationship of mutual participation 
(art. 485° CSC) exists when two companies hold each at least 10% of the capital of the 
other: in such an event, the company which performed its duty of information in the last 
place is prohibited to acquire new shares or parts of the other company. A relationship 
of domination (arts. 486° and 487° CSC) exists when one company is able to exercise 
directly or indirectly a dominating influence over another: this dominating influence is 
presumed to exist when the former company holds the majority of capital, the majority 
of the voting rights, or the right to nominate the majority of the members of 
management or supervisory organs of the latter. Finally, there is the relationship of 
group. Contrary to German law, Portuguese law does not contain a general and abstract 
notion of what is a group of companies, but it merely provides three types of specific 
instruments for its creation and organisation: these instruments are the total domination 
(arts. 488° to 491° CSC), the contract of horizontal group (arts. 492° CSC), and the 
contract of subordination (arts. 493° to 508° CSC).  
  A detailed analysis of each one  of these types of relationships shall be made 
further on. Before that, it might be instructive to add a few preliminary considerations 
about the general goals and structure of the law. 
 
  2. The Regulatory Problem 
 
  Similarly to company laws all over the world, the whole system of Portuguese 
company law is  based on the classical legal model of the individual autonomous 
company. This  “ideal model”  proceeds upon the assumption that the company is an 
independent economic and legal entity which equity capital is spread by a myriad of 
individual powerless shareholders interested in the best overall return on their 
investment (non-managing owners) and whose management is committed to a body of 
independent agents pursuing the best business interests of the company itself (non-
owning managers). In such a model, the small voting power held by each individual 
shareholder would presumably ensure in advance a sort of democratic internal harmony 
and balance among the various individual interests around a common company interest, 
                                                                                                                                 
6 See infra VIII.   6
which would  also be a guarantee  to  the interests of other constituencies such as 
creditors and workers. 
  The emergence of the phenomenon of  inter-company control  in modern 
economic life introduced a major crisis in this model. As a matter of fact, this ideal 
model may  enter in rupture as soon as a shareholder  who is economically or 
entrepreneurially active outside the company (namely, another company) acquires the 
majority of its voting capital. The point is that, contrary to what usually happens with a 
single or individual shareholder, a  corporate  shareholder is most likely to use its 
controlling power in order to pursue within the controlled company its own business 
interests at the cost of the self-interest of the latter: the external business activities of the 
controlling shareholder thus give cause to fear that the company will no longer be run 
as an independent business unity according to its own interests but will be made more 
or less subservient to alien business strategies and goals. With the destruction of the 
autonomy of the company, not only the company as an economic unity, but also the 
status of their minority shareholders and creditors, are seriously jeopardized.7 
   The crucial problem to which Portuguese law tries to bring an answer has to do 
with this contrast or gap between the classical or ideal legal model of the autonomous 
company and the real model of the dependent company, which was brought about by 
the emergence of the modern phenomenon of inter-company control.  
 
  3. The Regulatory Conception  
 
  3.1. The Purpose of the Law 
 
  The general goal of the law on affiliated companies is basically the one of a law 
aiming to protect the subsidiary company, its minority associates and creditors. In fact, 
the Portuguese legislator is  mainly  concerned with the problems raised by integration 
                                            
7 How odd and surprising this might sound to company lawyers of today, control of a company by 
another company was unanimously prohibited by the founding fathers of Corporation Law (for an 
historical insight, see ANTUNES, J., Enterprise Forms and Enterprise Liability – Is There a Paradox in 
Modern Corporation Law?, in: II “Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade do Porto” (2005), 
187-225). This makes plain why in Common Law systems it became usual to describe the introduction of 
the legal device of inter-company stock ownership as  the “turning point” in the evolution of American 
business corporation (CHANDLER, A., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American 
Industrial Enterprise, 30, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1962) and in Civil Law someone could also qualify it 
as a “revolution” (OTT, C., Recht und Realität der Unternehmenskorporation, 123, Mohr, Tübingen, 
1977).   7
and treatment of phenomena of inter-company control and groups of companies within 
the fold of classical company law, as the law of the individual corporation. This 
integration  was worked out basically  along two major legal  policy guidelines: the 
legitimation of the power of control of the parent company over the subsidiaries affairs 
and the corresponding protection for those subsidiaries.  
  On the one hand, it is the essence of traditional company law that each company 
constitutes a self-governed autonomous unity whose affairs are to be necessarily 
conducted according to its  own best  interests. However, at the same time, the 
quintessence of groups of companies as a legal and economic phenomenon lies 
precisely in the fact that each constituent company (subsidiary) becomes a dependent 
sub-unit whose affairs are directly or indirectly controlled by another company (parent), 
becoming thus purely instrumental to external or  alien business interests. The first 
regulatory task of the new regulation was then to solve this contradiction between law 
and reality, by providing for an  express  legitimation of the  (otherwise unlawful or 
fragile) exercise of the power of control of a parent company over the management of 
its subsidiary  and  the primacy of the group global interest over the interests of the 
various individual subsidiaries. On the other hand, there was also a regulatory need to 
set up the corresponding protective mechanisms for the subsidiary company, their 
minority associates and creditors. In fact, the (exceptionally permitted) subordination 
of a company to the  will and  interests of another company virtually destroys its 
economic independence, thus deeply affecting all those constituencies whose wealth 
ultimately depends on the preservation of that autonomy, first and foremost minority 
associates and creditors. A second regulatory task of group law was then to develop 
adequate compensatory schemes for each subsidiary company, ensuring that no power 
of direction for parent companies would be allowed without establishing at the same 
time special legal provisions intended to protect it. 
  This regulatory synallagm or linkage expresses the ultimate conception of the 
Portuguese law of 1986 on affiliated companies: institutionalization of power of 
direction of parent corporations and  of  the corresponding protection for subsidiary 
corporations, their minority shareholders and creditors.8 As a matter of fact, the main 
                                            
8  For further developments on this basic purpose of the law, see ANTUNES, J.,  Os Grupos de 
Sociedades, op. cit., 285ff.; TRIGO, M., Grupos de Sociedades, 47, in: “O Direito” (1991), 41-114. For a 
similar interpretation of the general purpose of German group law, conceived traditionally as  “ein 
Sonderrecht der abhängigen Gesellschaft”, see EMMERICH, V./ HABERSACK, M., Konzernrecht, op. 
cit., 10 ; HOMMELHOFF, P., Die Konzernleitungspflicht – Zentrale Aspekte eines Konzernverfassungs-  8
legal effects of the new law concern basically the protection of the “passive” side of an 
inter-company relationship: for example, in relationships of simple participation and 
mutual participation, the duty of information of the participating company in view of 
the participated company  (art. 484° CSC) and the connected prohibition of acquisition 
of shares and parts and voting rights suspension (art. 485°, nº 2 CSC); in relationships 
of domination, the duty of disclosure of the dominating company relating to majority 
holdings in the dependent company (art. 486°, nº 3 CSC);  and, most particularly, in 
relationships of group, the various compensatory mechanisms for the  subsidiary 
company, its minority shareholders and its creditors (arts. 494°, 500º, 501°, and 502° 
CSC). While being thus essentially a law of the subsidiary or dependent company, this 
does not means that the Portuguese regulation did not take into account the “active” 
side of inter-company relationships (that is, the parent company) or even the group as 
such. Among others examples, one could mention the legal norms on the prohibition of 
acquisition by the dependent company of shareholdings on its dominating company 
(arts. 325º-A, 325º-B, and 487º CSC), concerning the relationships of domination, and 
the ruling of powers, duties and liabilities of the parent company, concerning the group 
relationships (arts. 503º and 504º CSC).9 
 
  3.2. The Structure of the Law 
 
                                                                                                                                 
rechts, 35ff., Carl Heymanns, Köln, 1982; SCHNEIDER, U.,  Konzernleitung als Rechtsproblem  – 
Überlegungen zu einem Konzernverfassungsrecht, 249, in:  “Betriebs-Berater” (1981), 249-259; 
SCHMIDT, K., Gesellschaftsrecht, 491,4
th edition, Carl Heymanns, Köln, 1999. 
9 It is a merit of the so-called  “Lutter school” (Marcus LUTTER, Peter HOMMELHOFF, Wolfram 
TIMM, Uwe SCHNEIDER) to have drawn attention to the fact that the very existence of groups of 
companies leads to distortions at the level of the parent company itself (cf. LUTTER, M., Teilfusionen im 
Gesellschaftsrecht, in: “Festschrift für Carl H. Barz”, 199-218, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/ New York, 
1974; LUTTER, M., Zur Binnenstruktur des Konzerns, in: “Festschrift für Harry Westermann”, 347-368, 
Müller, Karlsruhe, 1974; LUTTER, M., Organzuständigkeiten im Konzern, in: “Festschrift für Walter 
Stimpel”, 825-854, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/ New York, 1985). In fact, the polycorporative structure of 
the group enables the parent’s board of directors to effect certain fundamental corporate decisions on its 
own without the involvement of the shareholders general meeting, as it would be the case if the overall 
business were organized in a single company. Thus, the sole existence of the group structure originates an 
enlarged realm of powers of parent’s management, which disturbs the internal balance of powers among 
the parent’s corporate organs, which can empty the original powers of general meeting of any meaning 
when substantial parts o f enterprise activity are shifted to subsidiaries, and which can even imply 
substantial dangers for shareholder’s dividend rights in consequence of an increased entrepreneurial risk 
for the assumption of which they were not consulted at all. This train of thought, characterized by its 
innovatory perspective of groups of companies “from above downwards” rather than as traditionally 
“from below upwards”,  is also increasingly adopted by Portuguese doctrine (cf. ANTUNES, J.,  Os 
Direitos dos Sócios da Sociedade-Mãe na Formação e Direcção dos Grupos Societários, UCP Editora, 
Porto, 1994; FRANÇA, M., A Estrutura das Sociedades Anónimas nas Relações de Grupo, AAFDL, 
Lisboa, 1991).    9
  This statutory conception has been carried out through a regulatory model the 
global understanding of which can be made in the light of a division between two major 
normative sectors.  
  One concerns the regulation of the relationships of group (arts. 488° to 508° 
CSC). The legal regime applicable to this sector of inter-company relationships 
constitutes the core of the Portuguese law, where the original statutory conception has 
found its clearest implementation and where companies may benefit from an open 
deviation to some of the canons of classical company law: on the one side, the law 
recognizes to the parent company a legal power of direction over the management of 
the business affairs of the subsidiary, to which, however, some contractual and legal 
limits have been set (arts. 493°, 503° CSC)10; on the other side, the law contains a 
system of protection for subsidiary companies, their outside shareholders and creditors, 
by imposing on the parent a duty of covering the annual losses of the subsidiary (art. 
502° CSC), a direct joint liability for the settlement of subsidiary debts (art. 501° CSC), 
and a duty of acquisition of the parts/shares of the subsidiary's outside shareholders (art. 
494° CSC)11. The legal mechanisms for the creation  and organization  of a group 
relationship are the acquisition of 100% participation of the equity capital of a company 
(art. 488° CSC), the celebration of a contract of subordination (art. 493° CSC) or the 
conclusion of a contract of horizontal group (art. 492° CSC). 
  The second normative sector comprehends the relationships of participation 
(both simple and mutual) (arts. 483° to 485° CSC) and, in particular, the relationship of 
domination (arts. 486° and 487° CSC)12. Since the legislator overlooked any substantial 
or  significant legal  consequences for this sector of corporate reality13, the general 
principles of classical company law – namely, the rule according to which a dominant 
shareholder is only admitted to exercise its controlling power within the strict respect of 
the autonomous business interest of the dependent company (art. 64° CSC) – are here 
fully applicable without any deviation. Given the well-known inability of these 
traditional rules to cope with the phenomenon of inter-company control and to offer a 
real protection to dependent companies, the entire system of Portuguese law seems to 
                                            
10 For further developments, see ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 718ff. 
11 ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 760ff. 
12 ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 328ff. 
13 As it shall be described in detail further on (see infra VI., 2.), the law attached to the relationship of 
domination (art. 486° CSC) a mere duty of disclosure of the instrument of domination in the financial 
statements of the corporations involved (art. 486°, nº 3 CSC), and a prohibition over the dependent   10
be built upon a regulatory imbalance which threatens its theoretical coherence and 
practical efficiency.14 
   
III. Scope of Application 
 
  The legal provisions on affiliated companies are not applicable to all types or 
forms of  relationships between enterprises  which are  conceivable in economic life. 
Instead, their application is dependent on three types of conditions, regarding the legal 
form of the companies involved (formal scope of application), the nationality of those 
companies  (spatial scope of application) as well as the nature of the affiliation 
relationship itself (substantive scope of application). 
   
  1. Formal Scope of Application 
   
  The first condition  regards  to the legal form of the subjects of the affiliation 
relationship: according to art. 481°, nº 1 CSC, the  law is only applicable when the 
enterprises involved in those relationships are either a stock corporation (“sociedade 
anónima”),  a  limited liability company (“sociedade por quotas”),  or  a  limited 
partnership by shares (“sociedade em comandita por acções”).  
Excluded from the scope of the law are therefore any other forms of enterprises, 
including other types of commercial companies  (such as g eneral partnerships: 
“sociedade em nome colectivo”),  civil companies (“sociedade civil”),  cooperatives, 
foundations, associations, individual businessman, and so on. Moreover, Portuguese law 
only applies to those relationships in which all the enterprises involved have one of the 
above-mentioned legal forms (and not just one of them, as it happens in German law15) 
and there is no tradition of jurisprudential expansion of the law16. Needless to say, this 
                                                                                                                                 
corporation to hold any shareholding in the equity capital of the dominant corporation (art. 487° CSC). 
14 From this regulatory structure, it emerges clearly the well-known distinction between “legal” and 
“factual” groups as well as its shortcomings. Since the legal regime applicable to situations of mere 
domination between companies (which correspond “grosso modo” to the reality of factual groups) is not 
sufficiently dissuasive in order to prevent the emergence of groups outside a legal basis, the figure of 
legal groups is highly devaluated and “factual” subsidiaries are thus offered no real protection. For a 
general critical overview of the structure adopted by Portuguese group law, see ANTUNES, J.,  Os 
Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 287ff. 
15 See, for instance, EMMERICH, V./ HABERSACK, M., Konzernrecht, op. cit., 22ff.  
16 There is so far no jurisprudential construction of the existing legal rules as to extend them to these 
other legal forms of private enterprises. Nevertheless, there are court decisions defending its application 
to  public enterprises (see “Acórdão da Relação de Lisboa”, of 26-4-1990, in: “Colectânea de   11
requirement reduces the practical efficiency of the law, since groups may avoid their 
own submission to it just by ensuring that their components, either the parent or 
subsidiaries, are organized along a non-relevant legal form  (v.g., foundation, general 
partnership); likewise, a discrimination within groups themselves is introduced, since 
the legal protection of subsidiary companies (as well as of their minority shareholders 
and creditors) will be different accordingly to their own legal forms.  
 
  2. Spatial Scope of Application 
 
  A second condition concerns the nationality of the companies involved: 
according to art. 481°, nº 2 CSC, the law only applies to those relationships established 
between companies whose “seat” or head office (“sede”) is located in Portugal.17 
   By excluding from the application of the law those inter-company relationships 
in which (at least) one of the involved companies has its head office abroad, this legal 
requirement seems rather problematic. On the one hand, it creates a sort of privilege of 
foreign groups in front of national groups: how odd and paradoxical it might appear, the 
fact remains that foreign parent companies may establish and run Portuguese 
subsidiaries without being forced to comply with the same legal constraints to which 
are submitted domestic parent companies18. On the other hand, the protection of 
Portuguese subsidiaries (as well as of their outside shareholders and creditors) is 
dissimilar according to the nationality of the controlling capital: subsidiaries of foreign 
groups may not benefit of the same protection which the law grants to subsidiaries of 
domestic groups. This double discrimination is not only contradictory with the very 
                                                                                                                                 
Jurisprudência” (1990), II, 163). 
17 This condition, however, has several exceptions (art. 481°, nº 2, “in fine” CSC). Any foreign company 
(i.e., any company whose head office is located abroad) which is considered to be a dominating company 
under Portuguese law is submitted to the following regime: a) the Portuguese dependent company may 
not acquire parts/shares of the foreign dominating company, on pain of the nullity of acquisition or the 
suspension of attached voting rights; b) the foreign dominating company may be held jointly liable with 
any member of the management or supervisory boards of the dependent company if the former causes the 
latter to take or omit any measure in violation of its fiduciary duties (art. 83° CSC);  c) both the 
Portuguese dependent company and the foreign dominating company must disclose any cross 
shareholding or mutual participation. Moreover, as it shall be seen further on (see infra VII.3) , a foreign 
company may form a group of total domination with a Portuguese wholly-owned subsidiary (arts. 481.º, 
nº 2, d) and 488.º CSC). 
18 For example, if a Portuguese company acquires 25% of the shares of a non listed stock corporation X 
whose head office is located in Portugal, the former must notify this acquisition to the latter, on pain of 
the prohibition of any acquisition of new shares and of the suspension of its voting rights (arts. 484° and 
485° CSC); however, if the acquiring company is a foreign one, it will be not submitted to such a duty of 
communication, nor thus to any type of the aforesaid legal restrictions.   12
basic purpose of the law19, but also to the general principles of equal treatment (art. 13°, 
nº 2 of the Portuguese Constitution) and of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality 
(art. 12° of the Treaty of Rome).20 
 
  3. Substantive Scope of Application 
 
  Finally,  a third condition concerns the  nature of the affiliation relationship 
itself:  as already mentioned, according to art. 482° CSC, the only relevant types of  
company relationships  are the relationships of simple participation, of mutual 
participation, of domination, and of group. This means that all those economic forms of 
affiliation between enterprises which do not fit into the concrete legal definition of one 
of these four types are excluded from the scope of the law.  
  In principle, only the direct and bilateral relationships of affiliation are legally 
relevant: for example, if a company A owns 60% of the capital of a company B and also 
60% of the capital of the  company C, there will be one relationship of domination 
between A-B and another one between A-C, but no relationship of any kind will exist 
between B - C. This principle has, however, exceptions  – and, as a matter of fact, 
important ones. On the one hand, the law admitted the existence of  indirect 
relationships by adopting a material, and not merely formal, notion of participation or 
shareholding: according to art. 483°, nº 2 CSC, for the purpose of determining the 
existence or the amount of a equity  participation in a company, are also relevant the 
shares or parts owned by a company holding a relationship of domination or of group 
with the former as well as the parts owned by a any third person (be it a natural or legal 
person) on behalf of any of those companies21. Thus, for example, if a company A owns 
                                            
19 As referred to by Klaus HOPT, “the general rules of private international law applicable to groups 
shall be derived from the purpose of the law to protect the creditors and outside shareholders of the 
subsidiary in the group. Thus, in principle, the law of groups follows the system applicable to the 
subsidiary” ( Legal Elements and Policy Decisions in Regulating Groups of Companies, 109, in: 
SCHMITTHOFF, C./ WOOLDRIGE, F.  (ed.), “Groups of Companies”, 81-111, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1991). 
20 For further criticism, see ANTUNES, J.,  O Âmbito de Aplicação do Sistema das Sociedades 
Coligadas, in: AAVV, “Estudos em Homenagem à Professora Doutora Isabel de Magalhães Colaço”, 
volume II, 953-975, Almedina, Coimbra, 2002; GAUSE, B., Europäisches Konzernrecht im Vergleich – 
Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage des portugiesischen Rechts, 66ff., Berlin Verlag/ Nomos, Berlin, 
2000. 
21 The adoption of a material or substantial concept of participation or shareholding, instead of the 
traditional formal concept, seems to have become almost universal. See, for instance, in Germany, § 16, 
IV of “Aktiengesetz” of 1965 (EMMERICH, V./ HABERSACK, M., Aktien- und GmbH Konzernrecht, 
30, 2
th edition, Beck, München, 2001), in Spain, arts. 82.º e 88.º of “Ley de las Sociedades Anónimas” of   13
5% of a company B, while holding 60% of company C, which also owns 5% in B, then 
A is considered to hold a participation of 10% in the capital of B, being accordingly 
submitted to the duty of communication of such participation (art. 484º CSC). On the 
other hand, the law admitted also the existence of multilateral, and not only bilateral, 
relationships of affiliation in the specific case of group relationships. Let us suppose 
that company A celebrates a contract of subordination with companies B and C and also 
owns 100% of the equity capital of companies D and E. At first sight, one could only 
speak about four individual or bilateral group relationships established between A and 
each one of the companies B, C, D, and E  (arts. 493º and 489º) – no relationships 
existing among these subsidiaries themselves. However, this is not the case. As a matter 
of fact, several aspects of the legal regime of the group relationship show clearly the 
multilateral  or multi-party  character of this type of affiliation relationship: thus,  for 
instance, the parent company A has a right to issue disadvantageous instructions to the 
management of a subsidiary (v.g., B) only if such instructions may serve the economic 
interest of any other subsidiary of the group (C, D, E) or the interest of the group as a 
whole (art. 503°, nº 2 CSC);  the parent company may enter into a profit transfer 
agreement with one of its subsidiaries, according to which the latter is compel to 
convey a part or even all its annual profits either to the parent or any other group 
member (art. 508°, nº 1 CSC); the board of management of the parent company has a 
duty of care and diligence towards, not only the parent itself, but also each individual 
subsidiary company as well as the group as a whole (art. 504°, nº 1 CSC); and so on.22 
                                                                                                                                 
1989 (DOÑA, M., Participaciones Recíprocas entre Sociedades de Capital, 220ff., Aranzadi, Madrid, 
1998), in France, arts. L.233-3, I, 1º and II, L.233-4, L.233-9, L.233-10 of “Code de Commerce” of 2000 
(GUYENOT, J., Les Participations d’une Société dans le Capital d’Autre Société, in: “Études à la 
Memoire de P. Azard”, 87-102, Paris, 1980), in Italy, art. 2359º, comma 2 of “Codice Civile” of 1942 
(SBISÀ, G., Società e Imprese Controllate nel d.l. 9 aprile 1991, in: “Rivista delle Società” (1992), 906-
934), or in the United Kingdom, secs. 93 (4) and 400 (3) of the “Companies Act” of 2006 (for the notion 
of “nominee holdings”, see FARRAR, J./ HANNIGAN, B., Farrar’s Company Law, 238, 4
th edition, 
Butterworhts, London, 1998). 
22 The relationships of affiliation provided for by art. 482° CSC are not mutually  incompatible, reason 
why a situation of plurality of relationships is possible to exist. Two types of plurality are foreseeable: 
real plurality and apparent plurality. The first case arises when two companies hold between them, at the 
same time, several different types of affiliation relationships: v.g., if A owns 60% of the capital of B and 
the latter owns 10% of the former, then a relationship of domination will coexist with a relationship of 
mutual participation (arts. 485°, nº 1,  and  486°, nº 2, a) CSC). The second case consists in those 
situations where a company holds simultaneously with two or more others companies (and not just one) 
several types of relationships: v.g., if A owns 100% of the capital of B, 15% of the capital of C and 20% 
of the capital of D, who owns on its turn the same percentage in A, then A will be deemed to hold, at the 
same time, a relationship of group, a relationship of simple participation and a relationship of mutual 
participation (arts. 489°, nº 1, 483°, nº 1, and 485°, nº 1 CSC). In both cases of plurality, it seems that the 
legal provisions concerning the different types of relationships at stake should be all applicable, except 
when the law had expressly provided otherwise (as it happens, for example, in case of relationships of   14
 
III. Relationship of Simple Participation 
 
  The first type of relationship between companies provided for by  Portuguese 
law is the relationship of simple participation. The legal definition and its main legal 
effects are rather plain: a relationship of simple participation  is deemed to exist 
whenever a company owns 10% or more of the capital of another company and there is 
between them no other affiliation relationship (art. 483°, nº 1 CSC), case in which the 
former has a duty to inform by writing its participation to the latter (art. 484° CSC).  
 
  1. The Legal Definition 
 
  This is a basic relationship, in two different senses. From an economic point of 
view, it constitutes usually the most elementary form of inter-company cooperation, 
corresponding to an embryonic stage of its eventual future concentration: while small 
equity participations obey normally to pure financial or investment objectives 
(maximization of capital return), participations above a certain p ercentage  –  in 
Portuguese law, 10 per cent. of the equity capital of the participated company – are 
deemed to pursue strategic objectives of control, employed frequently as a first step of a 
strategy of the participating company pursuant the acquisition of the control of the 
participated company. From a legal point of view, it represents a sort of fundamental 
type of affiliation relationship, since it holds a logic priority in front of all others types 
of relationship which are based on equity holdings, namely, the relationship of mutual 
participation, the relationship of domination (based on a majority of capital), and the 
relationship of group by total domination. 
The legal definition of the relationship of simple participation depends on the 
fulfilment of two conditions: a  positive  one  and a  negative one.  While apparently 
unambiguous and plain, this legal definition raises some difficult questions. 
  The positive condition says that the participating company should own 10% or 
more of the capital of the participated company (art. 483°, nº 1 CSC). Despite the 
silence of the law  regarding the concrete criteria orienting the  calculation of equity 
                                                                                                                                 
simple participation: cf. art. 483°, nº 1,  “in fine” CSC). With further details, see ANTUNES, J., Os 
Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit.,  325f.; to a similar problem, in German law, see SCHÜBERT, W./ 
KÜTING, K.H., Untermehmungszusammenschlüsse, 71ff., Franz Vahlen, München, 1981.   15
holdings, the doctrine considers that such computation is made by the comparison of 
two amounts: the amount of the nominal equity capital of the participated company and 
the nominal  amount of the shares or parts owned by the participating company. 
Concerning the first of these  amounts, it is  doubtful whether an eventual  self-
participation of the participated company (i.e., shares or parts hold by this company on 
its own capital) should be or not deducted from it; moreover, the problem of deduction 
of own shares/ parts of the participated company’s capital is not an exclusive problem 
of  the relationship of simple participation, but concerns also  all  other types of 
relationships based on equity holdings. The dominant position  in literature is to 
consider i n principle as irrelevant the eventual existence of self-participations, which 
therefore are not to be  deducted or took way  from  the nominal capital of the 
participated company for the purposes at hand23. Concerning the second of the above 
mentioned amounts, only shares or parts are applicable: in others words, are considered 
as irrelevant bonds of any type (including convertible bonds or bonds with warrant: arts. 
365° and 372°-A CSC24), mere participations in the profits of the company (“associação 
em participação”: arts. 21° and ff.  of  Decree-Law 231/81), or any other  financial 
instruments which do not represent fractions of the nominal capital of the participated 
company.25 
  The existence of a relationship of simple participation depends also on a 
negative c ondition, which prescribes that  between participating and participated 
companies should not exist any other type of affiliation relationship (art. 483°, nº 1, “in 
fine”, CSC): e.g., if a company A owns 51% of the capital of a company B, it shall be 
considered to exist here merely a relationship of domination between A-B, despite the 
                                            
23 A sole exception exists in the case of the relationships of group of total domination: see ANTUNES, J. 
Autoparticipações e Cômputo de Participações Intersocietárias, in: “Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. 
Doutor Raúl Ventura”, 275-291, Coimbra Editora, 2003; ROCHA, M., A Aquisição de Acções Próprias 
no novo CSC, Almedina, Coimbra, 1994. The position of German law and doctrine regarding the same 
problem  is somewhat  different: thus, while the law expressly provided for the deduction of self-
participations from the nominal capital of the participated company regarding the case of participations o f 
50% or more (§ 16, Abs. I I, 2 and 3 of AktG), the doctrine agrees in the opposite solution for 
participations of 25% or more (cf. KOPPENSTEINER, H.-G., Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, 
Band 6, 102 and 216, in: ZÖLLNER, W./ NOACK, U. (ed.), “Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz”, 3
th 
edition, Carl Heymanns, Köln/ Berlin/ Bonn/ München, 2004). 
24 Cf. ANTUNES, J., Wandel- und Optionsanleihen in Portugal, in: LUTTER, M./ HIRTE, H., “Wandel- 
und Optionsanleihen in Deutschland und Europa”, 212-241, Walter de Gruyter, New York/ Berlin, 2000. 
25 The law requires the sole  holding of the shares or parts by participating company,  being thus 
considered as irrelevant the fact that the rights (namely, voting rights) attached to such shares/parts  are 
suspended, limited or increased: e.g., preferential shares (art. 341°, nº 2 CSC), parts with double vote (art. 
250°, nº 2 CSC), shares/parts with voting rights suspended (arts. 251°, 381°, nº 6, 485°, nº 3 CSC), and so 
on.    16
fact that the positive condition of the legal “facti-species” of a relationship of simple 
participation had been also fulfilled; if A and B own reciprocally 15% of each capital, it 
shall be considered to exist between them a relationship of mutual participation and not 
two unilateral relationships of simple participation. This legal condition leads to rather 
unfair and paradoxical results, since it  exempts companies holding significant 
participations of capital from a duty of communication while imposing it at the same 
time to participations of a lower magnitude. Let us exemplify: if company A acquires 
15% of the capital of  company B, it is considered to exist a relationship of simple 
participation that would originate to A an obligation to notify by writing its acquisition 
to B (art. 484° CSC); however, if the same A  would instead  acquired 70%  of B ’s 
capital, it will be deemed to exist a relationship of domination, among which legal 
effects no similar duty of communication is provided for.26 
 
  2. Legal Consequences: the Duty of Communication 
 
  The  establishment of a relationship of simple participation creates to the 
participating company a duty of communication: according to art. 484° CSC, as soon as 
the participating company owns 10% or more of the shares/parts of another company, it 
must inform by writing the participated company of the acquisition realized, as well as 
of all further acquisitions or sales on the latter’s capital made during the period in which 
the capital owned remains higher than the legal minimum (10 per cent.).27 
  Paradoxically, the law provided no sanction for the case that the participating 
company did not comply with  its legal duty of communication. This omission 
compromises the entire efficiency of the legal regulation concerning the relationships of 
simple participation as well as the relationships of mutual participation. To start with, 
                                            
26 In other words, only equity participations between 10% and 50% shall be relevant in terms of creating 
relationships of simple participation: majority participations will originate in principle relationships of 
domination,  unless the legal presumption  contained on art. 486°, nº 2, a) CSC (establishing that a 
company holding the majority of capital of another shall be presumed to be a dominant company) has 
been rebutted. Different is the solution of other legal systems which also provided for similar duties of 
communication: see, for Germany, § 20, IV AktG ( BURGARD, Ulrich,  Die Offenlegung von 
Beteiligungen, Abhängigkeits- und Konzernlagen bei der Aktiengesellschaft, 51, in: 37 “Die 
Aktiengesellschaft” (1992), 41-55), and for France, art.  L.233-12 of “Code de Commerce” of 2000 
(GERMAIN, M., La Déclaration de Franchissement de Seuils, in : 26 “Revue de Droit Bancaire et de la 
Bourse” (1990), 20-32).  Critically also, ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 342ff.; 
TRIGO, M., Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 67. 
27 This duty is somewhat similar to the “Mitteilungspflicht” of German law, and similar duties are also 
today provided for even by countries who do not have a specific law on inter-company relationships, 
such as the Italian “obbligo di comunicazione” and the French “déclaration de franchissement de seuil”.   17
the omission of any type of sanction implies that  compliance with the duty of 
communication (and thus the achievement of the underlying regulatory goals) is left to 
the free will of participating companies themselves. But the same omission also 
jeopardizes indirectly the efficiency of the legal regime on relationships of mutual 
participation. As it shall be explained further on, the functioning of this regime is 
entirely dependent on the fulfilment of duty of communication of art. 484° CSC, that is, 
it is based on the  assumption that at least one of the reciprocally participating 
companies actually notifies its acquisitions to the other company: in fact, according to 
art. 485°, nº 2 CSC, the legal consequences of this particular relationship of affiliation 
(such as the prohibition of new acquisitions of shares/parts and the suspension of voting 
rights) are applicable to that company which fulfilled its duty of communication in last 
place. Therefore,  hoe odd as it might seem, mutually participating companies may 
paralyse  “motu proprio” the legal effects of this affiliation relationship by simply 
agreeing in not communicating to each other the acquisitions made. 
  As a way to overcome such omission  – which makes the law a true  lex 
imperfecta –, the doctrine sustains the analogical application of the sanction provided 
for in art. 485°, nº 3 CSC: the rights attached to shares or parts belonging to a 
participating company (obliged to inform the participated company pursuant  to  art. 
484° CSC) may not be exercised in case the former has failed to comply with its legal 
duty.28  
 
IV. Relationship of Mutual Participation  
 
  The  regulation of the relationship of mutual participation, both in its  legal 
definition and its effects, is contained in art. 485 CSC: an affiliation relationship of this 
type shall exist whenever two companies hold reciprocally participations in the amount 
of 10% or more in the capital of each other (art. 485°, nº 1 CSC); in such a case, the 
company which performed lastly its duty of communication is prohibited to acquire 
                                            
28 ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 368ff. This was also the solution provided for by 
German law in § 20, VII AktG (HEINSIUS, T., Rechtsfolgen einer Verletzung der Mitteilungspflichten 
nach § 20 AktG, in: “Festschrift für Robert Fischer”, 215-236, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1979; KLIX, 
R.,  Wechselseitige Beteiligungen, 33, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M., 1981).  To a similar, though not 
identical problem, see the solutions of Spanish Law (suspension of all rights attached to shares:  cf. 
DOÑA, M., Participaciones Recíprocas entre las Sociedades de Capital, op. cit., 321ff.) and of Italian 
law (suspension of voting rights: cf. LA ROSA, A., Le Società Controllate – I Gruppi, 655, in: Colombo, 
G./ Portale, G., “Tratatto delle Società per Azioni”, vol. 2, 581-665, Utet, Torino, 1991).   18
new parts/shares in the other company (art. 485°, n º 2 CSC); although acquisitions 
made against this prohibition are not void, they render the board of management of the 
acquiring company liable both in civil and penal terms and the rights attached to the 
participation at stake may only be exercised up to a maximum of 10%, except for 
liquidation rights (art. 485°, nº 3 and 5 CSC).29 
 
1. The Legal Definition  
 
The regulation of mutual participations  is today a  common denominator  in 
comparative company law, by being provided for even in those countries which do not 
have a specific set of norms on groups of companies: thus it happens, just for sake of 
example, in France (“participations réciproques ou croisées”: arts. L.233-29 and L.233-
31 of “Code de Commerce” of 2000), in Italy (“partecipazioni incrociate”: arts. 2359°-
bis and ff., 2360° of “Codice Civile” of 1942), in Spain (“participaciones recíprocas”: 
arts.  82º to 89º of “Ley de Sociedades Anonimas” of 1989), or even in the United 
Kingdom (“cross-shareholdings”: sections 136 and ff. of “Companies Act” de 2006)30. 
This regulatory tradition  also makes plain the reason why the Portuguese regulation 
does not contain any significant originality in front of the precedent models. 
  Similarly to the relationship of simple participation, the legal notion of a 
relationship of mutual participation depends also on a positive and a negative condition. 
  The first one consists in the existence of two mutually participating companies 
which are connected in such a manner that each company holds 10% or more of the 
capital of the other. However, this standard situation may be more complex. One 
should notice that not only direct but also indirect mutual participations are submitted 
                                            
29 We are concerned here only with the case of mutual participations between independent companies. 
Regarding cross participations between dominant and dependent companies, the legal regime is different, 
consisting basically in the application of the general principles and rules of self-shareholdings (arts. 487.º, 
325.º-A and 325.º-B CSC). On this regime, extensively, see ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades, 
op. cit., 422ff. 
30 In German law (§§ 19 and 328 of AktG), see EMMERICH, V., Zur Problematik der wechselseitige 
Beteiligungen, in: “Festschrift für Harry Westermann”, 55-74, Müller, Karlsruhe, 1974; KLIX, R., 
Wechselseitige Beteiligungen, op. cit.; SCHMIDT, K., Wechselseitige Beteiligungen im Gesellschafts- 
und Kartellrecht, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1995); in French law, see FLORÉS, G./ MESTRE, J., 
La Réglementation de l’Autocontrôle (Réglementation de la loi 85-705 du 12 juillet 1985), in: “Revue des 
Sociétés” (1985), 775-789; MICHAUD, P.,  La Réglémentation des  Participations Croisées et de 
l’Autocontrôle des Sociétés, in: “Gazette du Palais” (1985), 4-25; in Italian law, see COLOMBO, G., Per 
una Disciplina “Comune” delle Partecipazioni Reciproche, in: XXVII “Giurisprudenza Commerciale” 
(2000), 813-850; FANNELI, G., Le Partecipazione Sociali Reciproche, Giuffrè, Milano, 1957; in English 
law, FARRAR, J./ HANNIGAN, B., Farrar’s Company Law, op. cit., 237ff.; GOWER, L., Principles of   19
to the range of the law, where several companies are involved (v.g., if A owns 51% of 
B, B owns 15% of C and C owns 15% of A, A and C are considered to reciprocally 
participating companies pursuant  to  art. 485°, nº 1 CSC)31. Likewise, in terms of 
submission to the legal regime, is regarded as irrelevant whether the participations 
owned by the companies involved were acquired originally (i.e., subscription of the 
shares/parts in the  incorporation stage of the company or in a  subsequent  capital 
increase) or on a later occasion32; as it would be irrelevant the type of assets used in the 
said subscription or acquisition.33 
  The latter condition for the existence of a relationship of mutual participation 
establishes that between the reciprocally participating companies should not exist at the 
same time a relationship of domination. When a accumulation of these two different 
types of affiliation relationship occurs (v.g., a company A owns 15% of a company B 
and B owns 60% of A), then the legal regime applicable to the latter relationship shall 
prevail over the regime of the former (arts. 485°, nº 4, 487º, 325º-A and 325º-B CSC).34 
 
  2. The Legal Effects 
 
  There are three major legal consequences associated to this type of relationship: 
a) prohibition of acquisition of new shares or parts of the other company (art. 485°, nº 2 
CSC); b) in case of breach of this prohibition, voting rights coupled to the shares/parts 
newly acquired are suspended in the amount which exceeds 10% of the capital of the 
acquired company and the members of the board of management of the acquiring 
company may incur in civil and penal liability (arts. 485°, nº 3 and 510°, nº 2 CSC); c) 
duty of disclosure of the existence and amount of the mutual participations in the annual 
accounts of each of the mutually participating companies (art. 485°, nº 5 CSC). 
                                                                                                                                 
Modern Company Law, 212ff., 5
th ed., Stevens & Sons, London, 1992. 
31 These type of cross-shareholdings are known in comparative literature as “dreiekige Verhältnisse” (E. 
GEßLER), “ringförmigen Beteiligungen” (V. EMMERICH) or “participations circulaires” (Y. GUYON). 
See also KORCH, R., Ringbeteiligungen von Aktiengesellschaften Gesellschafts- und kartellrechtliche 
Aspekte, C. Heymanns, Köln, 2002. 
32 On the distinction between originary subscription (“originäre Erwerb”) and subsequent acquisition 
(“derivative Erwerb”), see EMMERICH, V., Zur Problematik der wechselseitige Beteiligungen, op. cit., 
60ff. 
33 Establishing some differentiations in the legal regime according to the concrete type of assets used, 
see, for instance, the Brazilian law (art. 244°, § 4, of “Lei sobre Sociedades Anónimas”) and, to a minor 
extent, the Italian law (art. 2359°-bis, comma 1, of the “Codice Civile”). 
34 See supra footnote 29.   20
  A major aspect of the law is that this set of legal effects is not applicable to both 
mutually participating companies, but only to “the one who has fulfilled its duty of 
communication  in last place” (art. 485°, nº 2 CSC). Let us suppose the case of a 
company A which acquires 25% of the capital of a company B, which on its turn also 
acquires in a later moment 10% of the capital of A. In such a case, two scenarios are 
possible. One is that A communicates promptly its acquisition to B: in such a case, 
managers of B  are prevented from acquiring new shares or parts of A, on pain of 
suspension of the voting rights attached to the new shares/parts and of its own exposure 
to civil and penal liability; on the contrary, the management of A may freely acquire 
new participations in B and exercise unlimitedly all the thereby attached rights. In the 
other scenario, A does not inform B of its acquisition, thus permitting B to anticipate 
the fulfilment of its own duty of communication: in this case, it is company B who shall 
enjoy of a freedom of acquisition and rights’ exercise, whereas A shall be prohibited 
not only  to increase its participation in B but also  to exercise the rights from 
shares/parts own in B in the amount of 15% (that is, the amount which exceeds the legal 
maximum of 10% in pursuance to art. 485°, nº 3 CSC).35  
  The efficiency of the core of the legal regime associated to mutual participations 
– that is to say, the suspension of the voting rights of the shares/parts in the amount 
which exceeds the legal limit of 10% (art. 485°, nº 3 CSC) – is rather doubtful. As it is 
well-known, cross-participations may lead to significant dangers both from the point of 
view of the patrimonial structure and the organizational structure of the mutually 
participating companies: on the one side, cross-shareholdings display patrimonial 
effects similar to a self-shareholding, leading thereby to a sort of “anacquamento” (G. 
COLOMBO)36, “Verwässerung” ( V.  EMMERICH)37,  or “irrealité” ( M. 
                                            
35 The rights which may not be exercised are all those which are inherent to the shares or parts in the 
amount exceeding 10% of the capital of the participated company, exception made for rights issuing from 
a process of liquidation of the company. Concerning the question of whether these non-exercisable rights 
are considered to be temporarily suspended or instead definitely extinct, the answer varies according to 
the concrete case: if there are rights which are non-repeatable and which should enrol in the  latter 
hypothesis (such as voting rights or information rights), there are others where a differentiated solution 
may be required (on the problem, see VENTURA, R.,  Estudos Vários sobre Sociedades Anónimas, 
391ff., Almedina, Coimbra, 1993; to a similar question in Germany, see GEßLER, E., Verlust oder nur 
Ruhen der Aktionärsrechte nach § 20 Abs. 7 AktG?, in: “Betriebs-Berater” (1980), 217-220; HEINSIUS, 
T., Rechtsfolgen der Verletzung der Mitteilungspflichten nach § 20 AktG, in: “Festschrift für Robert 
Fischer”, 215-236, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1979). 
36 Per una Disciplina “Comune” delle Partecipazioni Reciproche, op. cit., 813. 
37 Zur Problematik der wechselseitige Beteiligungen, op. cit., 57.   21
VANHAECKE)38 of the share capital of both corporations involved39; on the other side, 
they are  also responsible for subversive effects on the internal balance of powers 
amongst company organs, resulting in an enlargement of the scope of management 
powers in detriment to shareholders’ voting rights, thus operating as a mechanism of 
“verrouillage” (Y. GUYON)40. The type of legal sanction adopted by Portuguese law, 
however, seems able to cope only partially with of these dangers. While it is true that 
the legal sanction of art. 485°, nº 3 CSC prevents the organizational risks of cross-
shareholdings (since voting rights may not be exercised, the management of the 
mutually participating companies may not use cross-participations as a way to control 
indirectly their own General Meeting), it is also true that its patrimonial dangers remain 
completely unaffected.41 
 
V. Relationship of Domination 
 
  The third legal type of affiliation relationship is ruled by arts. 486° and 487° 
CSC, regulation which is made out of a general  legal definition, a set of  legal 
presumptions, and a few legal consequences.  
  A relationship of domination  (“relação de domínio”) between two companies is 
deemed to exist when one of them, said the dominating company, can exercise directly 
or indirectly a dominating influence upon the other, said the dependent company (art. 
486°, nº 1 CSC).  Given the difficulties of  constructing the central concept of this 
provision (dominating influence), the law  presumes its existence in three situations: 
when a company owns the majority of the capital of another, holds the majority of its 
                                            
38 Les Groupes de Sociétés, 90, LGDJ, Paris, 1962. 
39 For instance, if company A subscribes 1000 of the shares issued by company B, and the latter, in turn, 
subscribes 1000 of the shares issued from a raising capital operation of the former, then a fictitious capital 
in the amount of 500 would have been created in both companies A and B. 
40 The terminology is French (see GUYON, Y., Droit des Affaires, tome I, 636, 12
th edition, Economica, 
Paris, 2003), but the phenomenon is universal. Thus too D. PRENTICE: “It would appear that the reason 
why the cross-holding are used is to evade, or greatly reduce, the effectiveness of the provision in the 
Companies Act empowering shareholders to remove a director from office by simple majority vote. As 
votes attached to the shares held by one company in another would be cast by the directors, if the 
directors of various companies agreed not to vote these shares so as to remove a director from office, the 
directors would be virtually irremovable” (A Survey of the Law  Relating to Corporate Groups in the 
United Kingdom, 8, Brussels, 1988).  
41 The sole method able to cope efficiently with this specific type of danger is the one consisting in 
imposing an obligatory sale of the participations which were acquired in breach of the legal prohibition: 
this is the general solution provided for by several legal orders, such as (differences of detail left aside) 
the Spanish law (art. 83° of the “Ley de Sociedades Anónimas”), French law (art. L.233-29, II and L.233-
30, IV of the “Code de Commerce”), Brasilian law (art. 244°, §4 of the “Lei das Sociedades Anónimas”)   22
voting rights, or  has  the right to nominate the majority of the members of its 
management or supervisory organs (art. 486°, nº 2 CSC). Paradoxically, the law 
associated no specific legal consequences to this type of affiliation relationship: these 
consequences consist  just in a general duty of disclosure of the relationship in the 
annual accounts of both companies (art. 486°, nº 3 CSC) and in a general prohibition 
preventing the dependent company from acquiring any parts/shares of the dominating 
company (art. 487° CSC).42 
 
  1. The Legal Definition: the Concept of “Dominant Influence” 
 
  Taking a comparative law perspective, it appears that Portuguese law did not 
introduce any substantial originality concerning the classical juridical instrumentarium 
on the regulation of the phenomenon of inter-company control. Similarly to other legal 
systems, the structure of the regulation is based upon the combination of a  major 
substantive criteria – the concept of dominating influence (somewhat equivalent to the 
notion of “beherrshende Einfluß” of the § 17, I of German corporation law, but also not 
very far from other similar concepts, e.g., the one of “controllo” adopted by art. 2359.º 
of Italian corporation law) – with a set of more or less formal legal presumptions.  
  The concept of dominating influence is an elusive one, as elusive as the reality it 
describes43. To start with, notwithstanding the limited set of legal presumptions, a 
dominating influence can be created through a diversity of mechanisms, ranging from 
juridical mechanisms (e.g., majority voting power) to contractual mechanisms (e.g., 
contract of domination, management contracts), organizational mechanisms (e.g., 
articles of association) or factual mechanisms (e.g., personal linkages, strategic market 
positions)44. Moreover, a dominating influence can assume a wide variety of forms and 
                                                                                                                                 
and Italian law (art. 121º, comma 1, of the “Testo Unico della Finanza”). 
42 In exception to the limited spatial scope of application of arts. 481° and ff. CSC, these rules are 
partially applicable also to foreign enterprises (i.e. to companies who’s head office is located abroad): see 
supra III, 2.  
43 On this concept, see ANTUNES, J. Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 451ff. For similar concepts in 
other legal orders, see WERNER, H., Der aktienrechtliche Abhängigkeitstatbestand – Eine Untersuchung 
der Herrschaftsmöglichkeiten von Unternehmen in der faktischen Konzernverbindungen, WiRe Verlag,  
Göttingen, 1979; STORCK, M., Définition Légale du Contrôle d’une Société en Droit Français, in: 104 
“Revue des Sociétés” (1986), 385-404; LAMANDINI, M., Il “Controllo”  – Nozioni e Tipo nella 
Legislazione Economica, Giuffrè, Milano, 1995; COMPARATO, F./ SALOMÃO, C., O Poder de 
Controle na Sociedade Anónima, 4
th edition, Rio de Janeiro, 2005. 
44 Already more than  forty years  ago, its was noticed by Claude CHAMPAUD that  “the variety of 
techniques of control is such that it is impossible to found a common denominator to this reality. This is 
why one has excluded the concept of control from the world of juridical concepts and classified it along   23
of degrees of intensity in its exercise. It can be exercised directly by the holder of the 
strategic controlling position or indirectly through an intermediate person, be either 
natural (as it happens in the case of trustees or “Treuhänder”) or legal (namely, another 
corporation, as  it  happens in the case of multi-layer groups of companies or 
“mehrstufige Unternehmensverbindungen”45). It can be exercised positively, when the 
dominating company actively determines the entire sense of the business policy and 
management of the dependent company, but also sometime negatively, by preventing 
certain key  decisions  to be taken,  as  it may be the case of blocking minorities 
(“Sperrminorität”,  “minorité de blocage”) in the event of special general meeting 
resolutions  requiring a qualified voting majority ( such as amendment of articles of 
association, mergers or corporate reorganizations)46. It can be exercised exclusively by 
the company holding the control mechanism or instead in association to third parties, as 
it happens when the dominant corporate shareholder has to count on the votes of its 
fellow shareholders in consequence of voting  agreements  (“Stimmrechtsbindungs-
vertrag”, “convention de vote”, “patti parassociali di voto”)47. It can correspond to an 
influence falling upon the entire range of company affairs or exercised only over one 
specific business sector or decision-making area (the so-called “sectorial control”)48. It 
                                                                                                                                 
the open category of the concepts of fact” (original in French) (Le Pouvoir de Concentration de la Société 
par Actions, 154, Librairies Sirey, Paris, 1962). 
45 Both modalities are relevant in assessing the existence of a position of dominating influence: see, in 
Portuguese law, ANTUNES, J.,  Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 538ff.; on German law,  see 
REHBINDER, E.,  Gesellschaftsrechtliche Probleme mehrstufiger Unternehmensverbindungen, in: 6 
“Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht” (1977), 581-649; WERNER, H.,  Der 
aktienrechtliche Abhängigkeitstatbestand, op. cit., 180ff. 
46 In principle, only the positive control (“facere”) can be considered here as relevant, the negative 
control by veto or omission (“non facere”) being thus insufficient to create a dominating influence over 
the dependent company (on Portuguese law, see ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 
474ff.; on German law,  see  RASCH, H.,  Sperrminoritäten in Bankbesitz als Grundlage einer 
Abhängigkeit nach §17 AktG, in: 24 “Die Aktiengesellschaft” (1979), 49-51; SURA, A., Fremdeinfluss 
und Abhängigkeit im Aktienrecht, 66ff., Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 1980). Exceptions to this rule are to 
be found in cases where the exercise of a negative control may jeopardise the very economic survival of 
the company itself (on the so-called  “Existenzgefährdung” cases, see BARZ, C.,  Der 
Abhängigkeitsausschlußvertrag bei der Aktiengesellschaft, 191, in: “Festschrift für Johannes Bärmann”, 
185-201, Beck, München, 1975; WERNER, H., Der aktienrechtliche Abhängigkeitstatbestand, op. cit., 
110ff.). 
47 As a rule, only the control exercised autonomously by the dominating company seems relevant: cf. 
WERNER, H.: “The dominating influence should be at disposal of the dominating company” (original in 
German) ( Der aktienrechtliche Abhängigkeitstatbestand, op. cit., 113); WÜRDINGER, H.:  “The 
dominating enterprise must dispose alone of the instruments of the dominating influence” (original in 
German) ( Großkommentar zum Aktiengesetz, Bd. I/1, 147, in:  Gadow, W./  Heinichen, E., 
“Grosskommentar zum Aktiengesetz”, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/ New York, 1970). The relevance or 
irrelevance of this circumstance, however, has to be decided in the light of the nature and content of the 
concrete voting agreement at stake: see ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 499ff. 
48 There is a large debate on the relevance of the “sectorial” or “partial” company dependency. As a rule, 
it seems necessary that the dominating influence should cover all the areas and functions of the dependent   24
can consist in a stable situation of dominance over the decision-making structure of the 
dependent company or instead reflecting a mere sporadic situation of control, issuing 
from involuntary and fortuitous circumstances (as  it  happens  in the well-known 
occasional  or “de facto”  majorities in the general meeting)49. And so the number of 
examples can be multiplied.50 
 
  2. Legal Consequences: the Regulatory Imbalance 
 
  As previously referred to, the legal effects associated by Portuguese law to the 
situations of inter-company domination and dependency  are extremely scarce, 
consisting  merely in a general duty of disclosure of this relationship in the annual 
accounts of both companies (art. 486°, nº 3 CSC) and a general prohibition upon the 
dependent company to acquire any parts/shares of the dominating company (art. 487° 
CSC).  
  The scenario is rather different in the context of other  countries which also 
provided for a global regulation of the phenomenon of inter-company control. Take the 
case, for instance, of Germany: here, this notion gives the real center piece51 around 
which gravitates the basic distinction upon which is constructed the German regulation 
on groups of companies, the distinction between contractual and factual groups. Where 
a contract of domination has been celebrated, the parent company is given a broad legal 
power of direction over the subsidiary (including the right to issue instructions 
prejudicial to the interests of the latter), against a duty to cover all subsidiary annual 
losses and a duty  to compensate their  outside shareholders (§§291 and  ff.  of 
                                                                                                                                 
company, that is, the relevant control is only the one stretching over the enterprise as a whole 
(ANTUNES, J.,  Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit.,  464ff.). However, due  to the well-known 
interdependency of the various business sectors and managerial functions, it has been argued that the 
control over a single area of enterprise  business or management (mainly, finances and personal) can 
produce effects on the global management of the company,  being  therefore equally relevant (see 
DIERDORF, J.,  Herrschaft und Abhängigkeit einer Aktiengesellschaft auf schuldvertraglicher und 
tatsächlicher Grundlage, 78ff., 89, Carl Heymanns, Köln, 1978; PRÜHS, H.,  Grundprobleme der 
aktienrechtlichen Abhängigkeit im Spiegel der neuen Literatur, 311, in: 17 “Die Aktiengesellschaft” 
(1972), 308-311; WERNER, H., Der aktienrechtliche Abhängigkeitstatbestand, op. cit., 124). 
49 It seems that the concept of dominating influence should only apply to those situations  where a 
structural and stable power of control exists: see namely in Germany, GEßLER, E.: “Stability of the 
influence” (op. cit., 213); PRÜHS, H.; “Dependence as structural criterion” (op. cit., 309); WERNER, H.: 
“Institutionalized dominance” (op. cit., 118) (originals in German).  
50 For a detailed analysis of this concept on Portuguese company law, see ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de 
Sociedades, op. cit., 451ff. 
51  “Zentralbegriff des Aktienkonzernrechts”, in the words of EMMERICH, V./ HABERSACK, M., 
Konzernrecht, op. cit., 35.   25
“Aktiengesetz”). Where no contract of domination exists, the dominating company is 
submit to  the  respect the autonomy of the dependent company and may only issue 
instructions which are detrimental to the latter if at the same time it compensates the 
damages derived therefrom; moreover, in order to secure this duty of compensation, 
every dependent company must elaborate a so-called dependence report each year 
(describing and quantifying the individual transactions  hold  between  dominating  and 
dependent companies); finally, if the rules on detriment compensation and dependence 
report are disregarded, the dominating enterprise and its organs become liable for 
breach of these duties (§§ 311 and ff. of “Aktiengesetz”)52. The original intention of this 
legal regime on dominating and dependent companies was obviously the one of 
compelling the existing factual groups structures under legal control.53 
  The lack of any relevant legal consequences for the relationship of domination 
in Portuguese law  –  especially, the lack of any specific legal provisions aiming to 
protect and ensure the autonomy of the dependent  company  –  creates indirectly a 
dangerous and odd imbalance in the whole regulatory model. As a matter of fact, due to 
the absence of specific provisions, the general principles of classical company law are 
here fully applicable in the regulation of this inter-company relationship: thus, the 
dominant company is only admitted to exercise its dominating influence within the 
strict boundaries of the autonomous business interest of the dependent company (art. 
64° CSC), being submitted to the general rules on the protection of company patrimony 
(arts. 31° and ff. CSC), on the liability of members of the company organs for breach of 
fiduciary duties (arts. 72° CSC), on the liability of  majority shareholders for  the 
exercise of a damaging influence (art. 83°, nº 4 CSC), and so on. Given the well-known 
incapacity of these traditional rules to cope with the phenomenon of inter-company 
control and to offer a real protection to dependent companies (both in the sense that 
those rules are not sufficient to prevent the emergence of company groups outside a 
contractual basis and that they do not offer sufficient protection to  “de facto” 
                                            
52 The operational and juridical linkage between legal and “de facto” groups is strengthened by the legal 
presumption of § 18, I of the said law, according to which “if a dominating and one or more dependent 
enterprises are joined by the uniform direction of the dominating enterprise, then they constitute a group 
(«Konzern»)”. For an earlier and brilliant analysis of the original system of German legal regulation, see 
BÄLZ, U.,  Einheit und Vielheit im Konzern, in:  “Festschrift für Ludwig Raiser”, 287-338, Mohr, 
Tübingen, 1974. 
53 The official draftsman spoke about a “Vertragszwang” which only would allow to render “legally 
apprehensible and safe the formation of groups”: see “Begründung Regierungsentwurf”, in: KROPFF, B., 
Aktiengesetz – Textausgabe des Aktiengesetzes vom 6.9.1965 und des Einführungstextes zum Aktiengesetz 
vom 6.9.1965, 374 and f., Instituts der Wirtschaftsprufer, Düsseldorf, 1965 (original in German).   26
subsidiaries), the law is built upon a regulatory imbalance which threatens its 
theoretical coherence and practical efficiency. “Factual groups” will continue to survive 
in the loopholes of the traditional company law, exactly as they already did before; and 
the  figure of  “legal groups” is  largely devalued given the absence of any real 
advantages on its constitution and the lack of any type of dissuasive provisions against 
the formation of factual ones54. The best proof of such imbalance is that no contractual 
group has been so far created since the law has came into force more than 20 years 
ago.55  
 
VI. Relationship of Group 
 
  Contrary to German law, Portuguese law does not say what “is” a group of 
companies but it merely indicates what “are” those groups: in other words, the law does 
not provide  for  a general and abstract notion of “group of companies”, but simply 
points out three specific types of legal mechanisms for its formation and organization: 
these mechanisms are the contract of subordination (“contrato de subordinação”), the 
contract of horizontal group (”contrato de grupo paritário”), and the total domination 
(“domínio total”).  
 
  1. Contract of Subordination  
 
  The relationship of group created by the so-called contract of subordination – 
which is similar to the German “Beherrshungsvertrag”, to the Brazilian “convenção de 
grupo” as well as to “affiliation agreement” of the former European proposal of a 9
th 
Directive or the French “Proposal Cousté”56 – constitutes the core of the whole system 
                                            
54 As U. BÄLZ noticed for a similar problem, “would the exercise of the same power of direction also 
possible without a domination contract and their associated guarantees for external shareholders and 
creditors, then the entire new law would be running the risk of rendering itself ineffective” (original in 
German) (Einheit und Vielheit im Konzern, op. cit., 301). 
55 For a general critical overview of Portuguese law, see, ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. 
cit., 448ff. This shortcoming can only be partialy solved by the new rules of financial statements of 
companies, namely IAS 24 on disclosure of related party transactions. 
56 See respectively §§ 291 to 310 of German “Aktiengesetz”, arts. 265° to 277° of Brazilian “Lei das 
Sociedades Anónimas”, arts. 13° to 22° of the proposal for a 9
th Directive on Groups of Companies 
(version of 1984), and arts. 7° to 33° of the so-called “Proposition Cousté” (version of 1978). Although 
with a  tax law nature, see also  for  similar agreements in Switzerland (cf. SCHLUEP, W.,  Über 
privatrechtliche Freiheit und Verantwortung des kartellähnlichen Konzerns, 358ff., in: “Festschrift zum 
Geburtstag von Arthur Meier-Hayoz”, 345-394, Stämpfli, Bern, 1982) and Austria (cf. KRECJI, W., 
Partnerschaft, Verein, Konzern, 322ff., in: “Verhandlung des 10. Österreiches Juristentages”, Vol. I/1,   27
of Portuguese law on affiliated companies (arts. 493° to 508° CSC). The law contains a 
detailed regulation concerning the preparation of this contract (namely, a favourable 
general  meeting resolution of both companies adopted by a qualified voting majority: 
art. 496° CSC57), its celebration and registration (art. 498° CSC), its future amendments 
(art. 505° CSC) and its termination (art. 506° CSC). This contract represents a sort of 
organizational charter for the group relationship emerging therefrom and it is basically 
characterized by placing parent-subsidiary relationships into a special regulatory 
framework.  
  On the one side, in open deviation from the general canons of company law (e.g. 
arts. 64°, 72°, 83°, 84° CSC), the parent company is given a broad legal power of 
direction over the management of the affairs of the subsidiary company (art. 493°, nº 1 
CSC), including the right to issue instructions disadvantageous or contrary to the 
interests of the latter  in so  far as such instructions serve  the interest of the  parent 
corporation or  of any  other group affiliate. This power of direction is not unlimited, 
however: the parent company may issue instructions only in matters related to the 
management of the subsidiary (being prohibited to invade the sphere of competences of 
any other subsidiary organ,  e.g. the general meeting); it may not issue instructions 
which are forbidden from the viewpoint of other branches of the law, v.g., labour law, 
tax law (art. 503°, nº 2 CSC) or of the articles of association of the subsidiary company; 
and it may not issue instructions on intragroup transfers of assets without an appropriate 
compensation (art. 503°, nº 4 CSC)58. On the opposite to German law, Portuguese law 
does not regulate any other enterprise contracts59. The sole exception is given by the 
contract to transfer profits (“contrato de transferência de lucros”: art. 508° CSC). This 
contract, which may only be  concluded where a previous contract of subordination 
                                                                                                                                 
Viena, 1988). 
57 As things stand, a contract exists here in form, but not in substance: since the subsidiary company is as 
a rule already dependent via a majority shareholding hold by the parent company, the latter can 
unilaterally decide about the conclusion of such contract, its content and its termination. The law solved 
only partially this problem in art. 496°, nº 2 CSC, by imposing the obligatory  consent of at least one-half 
of the subsidiary’s outside shareholders (on this norm, see ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. 
cit., 676ff.). 
58 On the limits of the power of direction, see ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 733ff.; 
for a similar question in German law, KANTZAS, I., Das Weisungsrecht im Vertragskonzern, 97ff., Peter 
Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1988; SINA, P., Grenzen des Konzernweisungsrechts nach § 308 AktG, in: 36 
“Die Aktiengesellschaft” (1991), 1-10. 
59 On this other entreprise contracts (§ 292 of “Aktiengesetz”), see VEIT, K.-R., Unternehmensverträge 
und Eingliederung als aktienrechtliche Instrumente der Unternehmensverbindung, 33ff., IdW-Verlag, 
Düsseldorf, 1974.   28
exists60, imposes on the subsidiary company a duty to transfer all or just a part of its 
annual profits to the parent company or to any other subsidiary of the same group. 
  On the other side, the law contains a system of protection for the subsidiary 
company, its outside shareholders and its creditors.  Firstly, t he parent c ompany is 
forced to offer an adequate compensation to outside shareholders or members of the 
subsidiary company, which may be provided for in two major ways: one is a duty of 
acquisition of the shares/parts of minority shareholders/members who want to leave the 
subsidiary company, against a consideration in cash or in parent’s own shares/parts as 
stipulated in the contract of subordination (art. 494°, nº 1 CSC); another is the duty to 
guarantee a specific annual dividend  for those  minority shareholders/members  who 
decided to remain in the subsidiary (arts. 494°, nº 2 and 500° CSC). Proceeding from 
the assumption that the broad powers now enjoyed by the parent company can virtually 
void the economic and patrimonial substance of each subsidiary of the group, the law 
contains also a system of protection to the subsidiary company and its creditors by 
imposing on the parent company a duty to cover all annual losses of the subsidiary 
company (art. 502° CSC) and a direct joint liability for the subsidiary debts (art. 501° 
CSC). The first norm, which provides a system of  indirect protection for subsidiary 
creditors61, faces the efficiency problems which are commonly associated to these kind 
of mechanisms: given the numerous avenues for manipulation of the financial 
statements of subsidiaries opened up to parent corporations both by its general power of 
direction62 and by the large valuation freedom permitted by existing accounting law63, 
the integrity of assets of the subsidiary company  can in fact be seriously affected in 
spite of the said legal rule. More importantly, given that the protective scope of this 
                                            
60 Contrary to German law: see VAN VENROOY, G., Isolierte Unternehmensverträge nach § 291 AktG, 
in: “Betriebs-Berater” (1986), 612-616. 
61 Although being not able to proceed directly against the parent company to obtain  the settlement of 
their credits, subsidiary creditors are protected indirectly by the fact that the corporate debtor may not 
show any net loss (that is to say, since every loss has to be compensated, the subsidiary company benefits 
from a sort of solvency insurance as long as the parent company remains solvent). 
62  Thus, a ccording to art. 503° CSC, nothing seems to prevent parent companies to instruct the 
management of their subsidiaries to extinguish pre-contractual hidden reserves of the latter in order to 
reduce the global amount of annual losses: see ANTUNES, J., Liability of Corporate Groups – Autonomy 
and Control in Parent-Subsidiary Relationships in USA, German and EU Law. An International and 
Comparative Perspective, 335, Kluwer, Deventer/ Boston, 1994; PRÜHS, H., Die Substanzerhaltung der 
vertraglich abhängigen Aktiengesellschaft, 232, Diss., Bonn, 1978. 
63 The parent can  choose the moment of termination  of the contract of subordination to its own 
advantage: see on the topic ANTUNES, J., Liability of Corporate Groups, op. cit., 336; SCHATZ, S., Die 
Sicherung des Gesellschaftsvermögens und der Gläubigerinteressen im deutschen Konzernrecht, 109ff., 
Diss., Göttingen, 1980; WILHELM, H., Die Beendigung des Beherrschungs- und Gewinnabführungs-
vertrags, 50ff., Carl Heymanns, Köln, 1976.   29
legal provision is limited to stated subsidiary  losses, the law indirectly permits the 
emptying of its real economic-patrimonial substance as long as its formal book value 
has not been changed, through  a variety of legitimate stratagems, such as profit 
manipulation and syphoning, transfer pricing, use of subsidiary facilities without 
retribution, and the like64. These problems make rather plain the importance of the norm 
of art. 501° CSC, which provides for a direct liability of the parent company for 
subsidiary debts: this norm provides now a system of automatic and direct protection 
for subsidiary creditors. Under this system, the liability of parent companies is 
characterized by being a general liability (that is, which follows “ex lege” solely from 
its formal status as ”parent company”)65, unlimited liability (that is, irrespective of its 
timing or causal origin)66, although subsidiary liability (that is, proceedings may be 
brought against the parent company only  when the creditor has first made a written 
demand for payment from the subsidiary company and failed to obtain satisfaction after 
a period of 30 days: cf. art. 501º, nº 2).67 
                                            
64 Thus, it may well occur that the subsidiary company has been increasingly  drain of its assets while 
keeping the contrary appearance – and this not only during the period of duration of the contract, but also 
after it, where the subsidiary company may find itself deprived  from any chance of survival as an 
autonomous economic entity in the open market. Perhaps, it is precisely in this sense that scholars often 
speak about the contract of domination as a  “one way go” or  “point of no return” for subsidiary 
companies: LUTTER, M., Le Droit des Konzerne en RFA S’Est-Il Imposé Dans Les Faits?, 315, in: 2 
“Droit et Pratique du Commerce International” (1976), 305-324. See also ANTUNES, J., Liability of 
Corporate Groups, op. cit., 334ff. 
65 From the perspective of creditors of the subsidiary company, this means that they can readily obtain 
the settlement of their credits by the parent company, simply by alleging the formal grounds of the group 
relationship, i.e., the existence of a contract of subordination: thus, they need not to prove the existence of 
a causal linkage between the concrete subsidiary debts and the exercise of an actual control by the parent 
company (for a criticism on similar solutions in former EU law proposals, namely the 9
th Directive on 
Groups of Companies, see GUYON, Y., Examen Critique des Projects Européens en Matière des 
Groupes de Sociétés, 171, in: HOPT, K. (ed.), “ Groups of Companies in European Law”, 155-174, 
Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/ New York, 1982). 
66 As the full partner of a limited partnership, the parent is thus made unlimitedly liable for the debts of 
the subsidiary, irrespective of its origin (being also accountable for those debts which arose before the 
beginning of the group relationship: art. 501°, nº 1 CSC) or of their legal nature (including not only 
contractual liability but also tort, tax, labour or any other type of liability). In practical terms, this means 
that the guarantee of recovery of the creditors of each subsidiary company, traditionally limited to the 
assets and the capital of the single company debtor, potentially extends itself to the assets of the group as 
a whole. 
67 The parent’s liability is thus neither a pure joint and several liability (“gesamtschuldnerich Haftung”, 
(“responsabilité solidaire”) – in the sense that subsidiary creditors may freely chose between the assets of 
the subsidiary and of the parent in order to settle their claims – nor a residual liability (“Ausfallhaftung”, 
“responsabilité résiduelle”) – in the sense that parent companies should be made exclusively liable for the 
settlement of the remaining unpaid debts of insolvent or bankrupted subsidiaries. The liability of parent 
companies represents a sort of “subsidiary liability”, somewhere in between these two extremes: that is, 
parent assets are not placed side-by-side with the subsidiary assets at the free disposal of subsidiary 
creditors (joint liability) but creditors are not forced to wait until the insolvency of the subsidiary before 
proceeding against the parent (residual liability), being sufficient that they have made a written request to 
the corporate debtor which failed to obtain satisfaction.   30
   
  2. Contract of Horizontal Group 
 
  The relationship of group created and organised on the basis of an contract of 
horizontal group  – which is equivalent to the German  “vertraglicher 
Gleichordnungskonzern” and to the Brazilian  “consórcio”68  –   is  terra incognita in 
Portuguese law and practice69. This situation may be explained not only by the fact that 
groups of companies in Portugal are by definition groups of subordination but also 
because the law did not provide  for  any specific  rules on the  organization and 
management of horizontal groups. In fact, art. 492° CSC merely establishes the 
constitutive elements of this contract (independence of the companies and subordination 
to an unitary management: nº 1), some elementary aspects of its preparation and 
conclusion (nº 2 to 5) and is subordination to general rules of competition law (nº 6). 
The law completely omits any reference to effects stemming from the conclusion of 
such a contract, that is to say, does not make clear which principles will govern the 
functioning of the group itself, namely, the content and form of exercise of the power of 
direction, and the protection of associates and creditors of the companies involved.70 
 
  3. Total Domination 
 
  A final and most important form of creation of a relationship of group – which 
has some similarity to the German  “Eingliederung” and the Brazilian  “subsidiária 
integral”  – is the so-called total domination  (“domínio total”): this  shall be the case 
whenever a company, said totally dominating company, holds 100 per cent. of the 
equity capital of another company, said totally dependent. The law distinguishes 
                                            
68 See in comparative literature BAYER, W., Horizontal Groups and Joint Ventures in Europe: Concepts 
and Reality, in: HOPT, K. (ed.), “Groups of Companies in European Laws”, 3-17, Walter de Gruyter, 
Berlin/ New York, 1982; DEFALQUE, P., Le Groupe Horizontal de Sociétés et son Traitement en Droit 
de la Concurrence, in:  “Cahiers de Droit Européen” (1981), 437-448; GROMANN, H.,  Die 
Gleichordnungskonzern im Konzern- und Wettbewerbsrecht, Carl Heymanns, Köln, 1979; SACRISTÀN, 
M., El Grupo de Estrutura Paritaria: Caracterización y Problemas, in: 165/166 “Revista de Derecho 
Mercantil” (1982), 375-398. 
69 To use the words of SCHMIDT, K., Gleichordnung im Konzern: terra incognita? – Vorstudien und 
Thesen zu einem Recht der Konzernschwestern,  in: 155  “Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und 
Unternehmensrecht” (1991), 417-446. 
70 As a rule, an analogical application of the legal provisions of the arts. 488° and ff. CSC to groups 
created on the basis of an horizontal group contract is forbidden: see ANTUNES, J., Os Grupos de 
Sociedades, op. cit., 926; in the opposite sense, TRIGO, M., Grupos de Sociedades, op. cit., 97.    31
between two types of total domination. One is the originary total domination (“domínio 
total inicial”): thus, equally to many other legal systems, also the Portuguese law admits 
a company to create a public or private limited company of which the former is “ab 
initio” the sole shareholder (arts. 488° and 270.º-A CSC)71. The other is the derivate 
total domination ( “ domínio total superveniente”), which consists in the situation in 
which a company acquires  subsequently  the entire capital of an already existing 
company (art. 489° CSC). 
  While the group formed through a contract of subordination follows very closely 
the German  legal  model and the group created through an horizontal contract still 
remains terra incognita, the Portuguese rules on  groups by total domination present 
some original aspects72.  One concerns the broader spatial scope of application the 
norms of art. 488º and ff. CSC: as a matter of fact, contrary to what would result from 
arts. 481.º, nº 2 CSC, a foreign company may form a group by initial total domination 
with a Portuguese wholly-owned subsidiary (art. 481º, nº 2, d) CSC)73. Another is that 
the law, while requiring the agreement of the General Meeting of the parent company 
for the formation of groups based on subsequent total domination (art. 489°, nº 2 CSC), 
apparently considered the formation of groups  by initial total domination as being a 
mere competence of the board of management (arts. 488°, nº 1 and 405.º, nº 1 CSC)74. 
                                            
71 The figure of the wholly-owned subsidiary corresponds to a sort of universal or general trend of 
company law worldwide: amongst many other countries, this is the case of Belgium (“loi du 5 décembre 
1984” and “loi du 14 juillet 1987”: cf. WYMEERSCH, E., L’Introduction de la Société Unipersonelle en 
Droit Belge, in: XXXIII “Rivista delle Società” (1988), 836-855), of Brasil (art. 251.° of “Lei das 
Sociedades Anónimas”: cf. COMPARATO, F., Les Groupes de Sociétés dans la Nouvelle Loi Brésilienne 
des Sociétés par Actions, op. cit., 859ff.), of France (art. L.223-1 of “Code de Commerce”: cf. DAIGRE, 
J.-J., La Société Unipersonelle en Droit Français, in: “Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé” (1990), 
665-687),  of Germany (§1 of “GmbH-Novelle”  and § 2 of “Aktiengesetz”:  cf.  FLUME, W.,  Die 
Gründung der Einmann-Gesellschaft nach der Novelle zum GmbH-Gesetz, in: 33 “Der Betrieb” (1980), 
1781-1784), of Italy (art. 2463º, comma 1, of “Codice Civile”: cf. CHIEFFI, I., La Società Unipersonale 
a Responsabilità Limitata, Giappichelli, Torino, 1996), of Luxemburg (art. 179º of “Loi des Sociétés 
Commerciales”: cf. MARTIN, P./ GAETANO, C., La Società Unipersonale nel Diritto Lussemborghese, 
in: “Le Società” (1994), 125-137), of Spain (arts. 125.º e segs. of “Ley de Sociedades de Responsabilidad 
Limitada”:  cf. CASCÓN, F., La Sociedad de Capital Unipersonal, Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002), of the 
United Kingdom (section 7 (1) of “Companies Act”: AAVV, Palmers’ Company Law, Vol. I, Part 2 
(Companies Formation), 2.108, 25
th edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), and of the United States 
of America (§ 2.01 of the “Model Business Corporation Act”, § 101(a) “Delaware General Corporation 
Law”, §§ 201 e 505 “Michigan Business Corporation Act”:  cf.  FULLER, W.,  The Incorporate 
Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, in: LI “Harvard Law Review” (1978), 1373 e segs). 
72  Groups formed by total domination  are submitted to the same regime applicable to groups of 
subordination, above reviewed at VII, 1. (cf. art. 491 CSC), exception made, of course, to those legal 
provisions aiming to the protection of outside associates. 
73 On the spatial scope of application of the law, see supra III., 2. 
74 Notwithstanding the legal  discrepancy, a part of the doctrine  proposes  a  global  system of co-
participation of shareholders of parent companies in the formation of groups based in 100% 
shareholdings, either derivate or originary (cf. ANTUNES, J., Os Direitos dos Sócios da Sociedade-Mãe   32
Finally,  one should mention the obligatory  squeeze-out of minority shareholders 
(“aquisição tendente ao domínio total”): according to art. 490° CSC, whenever a 
company owns 90% or more of the equity capital of another company, the former has 
the right (and, in certain cases, the duty) of purchasing the remaining shares/parts on the 
dependent company, against a settlement in cash or other values75. This is probably one 
of the most relevant legal provisions of entire group Portuguese group law, both from a 
practical and theoretical point of view, giving rise to a large controversy in doctrine and 
jurisprudence.76 
   
VIII. Corporate Groups  in other Branches of Law 
 
  The law of corporate groups is becoming more and more an interdisciplinary 
law.  And p erhaps the major recent innovations  and driven forces  concerning the 
regulation of  this economic phenomenon are not originating from Company Law but 
from other legal branches. 
  Both in tax law and in accounting law, groups are being increasingly seen as a 
legal, and not merely an economic, unity: this is the case of the special regime on the 
taxation of group consolidated profits (arts. 63º and ff. of “Code on Taxation of the 
Income of Legal Persons”) and on the presentation of group consolidated accounts 
(Decree-Law nº 239/91)77. In  labour law, the group is also treated as a unity both 
regarding the regulation of key aspects of the individual labour relations – for instance, 
allowing parent corporations to transfer workers among their subsidiaries (arts. 92º and 
                                                                                                                                 
na Formação e Direcção dos Grupos Societários, op. cit.; FRANÇA, M., A Estrutura das Sociedades 
Anónimas nas Relações de Grupo, op. cit.). 
75 This mechanism – whose historical origins seem to be found in the so-called “compulsory purchase” 
provided for by sec. 209 of the English “Companies Act” of 1948 – has also become well-known in 
several legal orders, such as the “offre de retrait obligatoire” of French Law (arts. 5-6-3 e 5-6-7 of the 
“Réglement Général du Conseil des Marché Financiers”:  cf.  BAJ, C.,  Le Retrait Obligatoire des 
Actionnaires Minoritaires des Sociétés Cotées, in: 44 “Revue de Droit Bancaire” (1994), 154-163), the 
“offerta d’acquisto residuale”  of Italian law (arts. 108º e 161º of “Testo Unico delle Disposizioni in 
Materia di Mercati Finanziari”: cf. VENTORUZZO, Marco, Offerta Pubblica di Acquisto Residuale, in: 
Marchetti, P./ Bianchi, L., “La Disciplina delle Società Quotate”, tomo I, 407 e segs., Giuffrè, Milano, 
1999), the “Eingliederung” and “Ausschluss von Minderheitsaktionären” in Germany (§§ 320 and ff., 
327a and ff. of “Aktiengesetz”:  cf.  MORITZ, H.,  Squeeze Out: Der A usschluss  von Minderheits-
aktionaeren nach 327a ff AktG, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2004; VEIT, K.-R., Unternehmensverträge und 
Eingliederung als aktienrechtliche Instrumente der Unternehmensverbindung, op. cit., 47ff.). 
76 After the Supreme Court of Justice having considered the rule as being unconstitutional (cf. “Acórdão 
do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça”, of 2-10-1997), the Constitutional Court decided in the opposite sense, 
holding the validity of art. 490.º CSC (“Acórdão do Tribunal Constitucional nº 491/02”, of  26-11-2002). 
On the issue, see ANTUNES, J., A Aquisição Tendente ao Domínio Total, Coimbra Editora, 2001.   33
324º of “Labour Code”) and imposing on them an unlimited liability for the payment of 
salaries of subsidiary workers (art. 378º of “Labour Code”) – and in collective labour 
relations – namely, the constitution a of  group labour committees (art. 461º, nº 3 of 
“Labour Code”)78. In  banking law, the so-called financial groups are subjected to a 
regime of consolidated supervision by the Portuguese central bank, meaning essentially 
that the parent corporation and subsidiaries must comply to a set a common prudential 
ratios (arts. 130º and ff. of the “Law of Credit Institutions and Financial Companies”)79. 
In  capital market law, groups are bound to important information and transparency 
duties related to the owning of shareholdings in subsidiary listed companies (arts. 16º 
and ff.  of  “Code of Securities”), while at the same time the law grants them some 
specific mechanisms such as the compulsory squeeze-out of minority shareholders (arts. 
194º and ff. of the said Code)80. And many other similar norms could be referred to, 
e.g., in  competition law (where the group has been expressly  qualified as one single 
enterprise for the application of the anti-trust laws: art. 2 º, nº 2 of “Law of 
Competition”)81, in insolvency law (where the credits of parent corporations are treated 
as subordinated credits in the event of subsidiary bankruptcy: arts. 48º, a) and 49º, nº 2, 
b) of the “Insolvency Code”)82, and so on. 
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